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DOG LAWS, OLD AND NEW
Pennsylvania dog laws begin with the Act of March 23,
1809, 5 Sm. L. 36. This act was followed by innumerable local statutes and numerous general laws. Pepper & Lewis'
Digest, 2d Ed., at p. 2994, gives a list of local acts which
shows such acts enacted for forty-eight counties and as many
as thirty-five different local acts relating to dogs in a single
county. Few were the legislatures that did not enact dog
laws. The general borough act of 1851, Sec. 2, cl. XXV empowered boroughs to levy annual dog taxes, prohibit the
running at large of dogs and provide for their killing or seizure and sale. The Borough Code of 1915 continued this power. Ch. V, Art. 1, Sec. 2, cl. XXVIII. Like powers are given
townships of the first class by the Act of May 15, 1915, P.
L. 520. All cities were given this power by the Act of June
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10, 1881, P. L. 119. It is little wonder that the legislature
has declared dogs to be both a public nuisance and under certain circumstances a private nuisance. The demand for legislation appears to have made them a continuing nuisance to
the legislature.
In 1917 the first attempt to establish a "uniform system throughout the commonwealth for the licensing of dogs
and the protection of live-stock and poultry from injury by
dogs" was enacted. Act of July 11, P. L. 818. It directs
that it be known as "The Dog Law of 1917." It however
leaves unaffected acts relating to mad dogs, dogs affected
with any disease, and acts for the protection of game. This
act still leaves the amount of the dog tax in each county to
be fixed by the county commissioners and in cities of the
first and second class by the city councils. It specifically
repeals fifteen other acts and all other inconsistent acts,
general and local.
In 1921 a second uniform dog act was passed, required to
be known and cited as the "Dog Law of 1921." Act of May
11, 1921, P. L. 522. It repeals the "Dog Law of 1917" except in so far as it provides for the licensing of dogs and
the payment of damages inflicted by dogs and damages for
the illegal killing of dogs in cities of the first and seconc
class. Sec. 39, and Sec. 43. The Act of 1917 is accordingly
operative in the cities named and that of 1921 throughout the
rest of the state. In 1923 five sections of the Dog Law of
1921 relating to the determination of damage claims and their
payment and the disposition of the excess of the proceeds of
dog licenses not needed to pay damage claims were amendAct of
ed but the Dog Law of 1917 was not amended.
March 19, 1923, P. L. 16.
-It is proposed to call attention to the origin of many
provisions of these recent acts, point out wherein they differ from each other and to consider briefly whether they involve taxation offending the constitutional requirement of
uniformity and whether the prohibition of local legislation
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has been violated in preserving the Act of 1917 as the law
operative in cities of the first and second class, while the
rest of the Commonwealth is governed by the provisions of
the Acts of 1921 and 1923.
Sec. 2 of both uniform acts supply definitions of the
terms used therein. They disclose that "confined domesticated hares and rabbits" are protected as "live-stock" outside of the named cities but not therein.
The license fees payable by dog owners outside of the
named cities are definitely fixed by the Act of 1921 but
larger fees may be required in such cities in the discretion of
their councils, the Act of 1917 merely fixing minimum and
maximum fees. The Act of May 15, 1889, P. L. 222, provided for a definite license fee in boroughs and townships.
This act was supplied by the Act of May 25, 1893, P. L. 136,
which left the amount of the license fee to be fixed by the
local taxing authorities and was declared applicable in cities,
boroughs and townships, the act merely naming a maximum
fee. In counties the commissioners fixed the rate and in
cities the councilmen. The act of June 3, 1915, P. L.
791, empowered the councilmen of boroughs to fix
the rate therein. The Dog Law of 1917 vests this power
exclusively in the county commissioners and in the councilmen of cities of the first and second class. The Dog Law of
1921 reverts to the policy of the act of 1889 in fixing a definite fee outside of the two classes of cities named.
THE SUMMARY KILLING OF DOGS
The Act of March 23, 1809, supra, seeks to promote the
growing of sheep in two ways. First, it provides a progressive dog tax, the proceeds of which were appropriated to remunerate the owners of sheep destroyed by dogs. Second,
it authorized anyone to kill dogs caught chasing or worrying
sheep or accustomed so to do. The act originally applied
only to Philadelphia and four adjoining counties. But the

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

section providing for summary killing was extended throughout the" state by the Act of March 29, 1813. The same provision is supplied by the 7th section of the Act of April 14,
1851, P. L. 712, and the 8th section of this act imposes absolute liability for injury to sheep upon the owner of the offending dog, proof of his knowledge of its propensity to do so
being dispensed with. Both the recent acts require every
police officer to kill every dog found running at large which
does not bear a proper license tag. The first act to require
that all dogs wear collars and tax tags is that of June 1, 1907,
P. L. 362. The requirement is repeated in the Acts of June
15, 1911, P. L. 968; May 20, 1913, P. L. 259; and June 3, 1915,
P. L. 791. The Act of 1907 required tax cpllectors to notify
dog owners to comply with this requirement within ten days
or kill their dogs. Upon noncompliance with this notice,
constables were required to kill untagged dogs. Any citizen
could give the notice with like effect. Sec. 7 of the Act of
1911, now supplied by Sec. 21 of the Dog Law of 1917 and
Sec. 22 of the Dog Law of 1921, declared all dogs not wearing tax tags to be a public nuisance and authorized the owner or tenant of any land on which such a dog entered to kill
it without liability to its owner. The killing of tagged dogs
on sight by the owner of sheep or his employee, if the dog
was found in a field where there were sheep, unless the dog
was accompanied by its owner, was authorized by the Act of
June 3, 1915, P. L. 790. Another act passed the same date,
P. L. 791, required thirty days' notice by the county commissioners of their intention to have all dogs killed which
did not wear tags. After notice they are authorized to call
on the state constabulary to aid in killing dogs. The recent
acts protect licensed dogs when accompanied by their owner or handler, unless caught in the act of worrying, wounding, or killing any live stock, or attacking human beings.
Under these circumstances anyone may kill any dog without
liability for so doing. There can be no doubt as to the constitutionality of legislation providing for the summary killing of
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dogs. As is said in Monroe Boro. vs. Walborn, 17 D. D. 1053,
"Dogs are peculiarly the subject of police regulations of the
most stringent character and the most summary proceedings
for the destruction of these animals, kept contrary to such regulations, are entirely within legislative power and free from
constitutional objection, though the property of the owner is
destroyed without notice or hearing in the execution of the
law." Citing numerous cases. The constitutionality of the
Dog Law of 1917 was questioned in Com. vs. Fribertshauser,
263 Pa. 211 but only on the ground of an alleged insufficiency
of title. It was held that the title gave notice of an intent to
deal with the whole subject of taxing or licensing dogs and
that accordingly no express mention of the disposition made
of such taxes was necessary, and that such a general act, complete in itself and intended to create a new system, need not
contain in its title notice of an intent to repeal earlier laws on
the same subject. In fact only one of the innumerable dog
acts appears to have been declared unconstitutional on any
ground. The Act of June 12, 1878, P. L. 198, provided that
it should take effect in each county only after a majority in
each county had voted in its favor. Frost vs. Cherry, 122
Pa. 417, had held a like provision to invalidate another act
as calculated to produce local laws and this was held to be
controlling in the attack on this dog law. Bowen vs. Tioga
County, 6 C. C. 613.
THE REGISTRATION OF DOGS
The registration of dogs begins with the Act of April
6, 1854, P. L. 286, originally applicable in but five counties
but extended throughout the state by the Act of May 18,
1878, P. L. 72. It authorized owners of dogs to register a
description of each dog with the clerk of the court of quarter
sessions and receive a certificate which was transferrable
on a sale of the dog. Registered dogs were declared to be
personal property and the subject of larceny. The Act of
May 25, 1893, P. L. 136, made a like provision as to all dogs,
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though its title merely indicates that it is a taxing statute.
The provision was held to be germane to the subject of the
act and the provision not unconstitutional in Com. vs. Depuy,
148 Pa. 201. The Act of May 15, 1889, P. L. 222, which imposed a uniform dog tax in boroughs and townships had
contained a like provision. Such a provision is found in sec.
22 of the Dog Law of 1917 and in sec. 23 of the Dog Law of
1921. Under both acts one applying for a dog license must
state the breed, sex, age, color, and markings of his dog and
the name and address of the last previous owner. The license given must contain this description of the dog. Sec.
9 of each act permits the transfer of licenses when the ownership or possession of a dog is- permanently transferred
from one person to another within the same county, merely
upon notice given to the county treasurer.
DAMAGE CLAIMS
The propriety of indemnifying the owners of useful animals against loss and damage by dogs, and the necessity that
this be done in the case of sheep, has been recognized since
the date of our" earliest legislation on this subject. The Act
of 1809, supra, appropriated the entire proceeds of dog licenses to the reimbursement of sheep owners, except in Philadelphia, in which, no doubt, there was no sheep industry to
encourage. In Philadelphia the proceeds went to the guardians of the poor. In the various local acts the proceeds ot
dog licenses have been made available for a variety of purposes but the usual appropriation is first to the payment of
damage claims.. The Act of April 11, 1901, P. L. 73, made
dog funds available for the payment of losses sustained
when horses, mules, cattle and swine were bitten by mad
dogs but limits the amount payable in each case. The recent
acts make the dog funds available for payment of losses to
all animals within the statutory definition of "livestock or
poultry" and also to indemnify the owners of licensed dogs
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illegally killed, when the one so killing fails to pay the value
of the dog killed. $100 is the limit recoverable for any dog
so killed.
SWOLLEN DOG FUNDS
Dog funds often exceed the demands of damage claimants and the disposition directed to be made of the surplus
has varied from time to time. The Act of 1809, supra, applied this surplus to the improvement of the breed of sheep
and cattle in each county. The Act of May 15, 1889, P. L.
222, directed the transfer to the school fund of all over $100
in the dog fund at the end of each year. The Act of May 25,
1893, P. L. 136, directed the transfer into the general county
or city funds of all over $200 in the dog fund at the end of
each year. The Act of April 23, 1901, P. L. 92, directed
that such surplus over $200 should be transferred at the end
of each year to the townships, boroughs and cities in the
proportion in which such fees 'had been collected in each.
Sec. 15 of the Dog Law of 1917 directs that any excess moneys collected should be available for general county purposes.
Sec. 16 of the Dog Law of 1921 creates a state dog fund in
the hands of the State Treasurer and all moneys therein are
appropriated to the Department of Agriculture but it directs
that on.Nov. 30th of each year all over $25,000 in this fund
should be transferred into the general fund of the State
Treasury. This last provision is stricken out by the 1923
amendments and the fund is now made available not only
to pay damage claims but also "for the payment of indemnities for animals afflicted with dangerous, contagious or infectious diseases as provided by law, and for the payment
of the salaries and expenses of the Director" and other employees of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department
of Agriculture. Act of March 19, 1923, P. L. 16.
PROCEDURE TO RECOVER DAMAGES
The procedure to recover damages for losses caused by
dogs is now as set forth in the act of March 19, 1923, P. L.
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16, except in cities of the first and second class, in which
the procedure is as set forth in the Dog Law of 1917. Under
the 1923 act the complaint must be made immediately after
the damage is done. Under both the complaint is made to
a township auditor, justice of the peace, magistrate or alderman in writing signed by the complainant, stating when,
where, and how the damage was done, and by whose dog or
dogs, if knQwn. The officer receiving the complaint is sole
appraiser under the 1917 act. Under the 1923 act he must
at once notify an auditor of the district and if there be none,
then the controller and at once examine the injured animals
and the place of injury. The appraiser or appraisers examine,
under oath or affirmation, any witnesses called before them,
make diligent inquiry, fix the amount of the damage, if any,
and the ownership of the guilty dog or dogs, if possible.
Such owner is declared by both acts to be liable to the owner
of the injured animals for all damages and costs or to the
Commonwealth to the extent it pays such damages and costs
to the owner of the injured animals. The claim of the Commonwealth is created by the act of 1921. Under the 1917
act the liability was to the "county" but as this act is now in
force only in cities of the first and second class, "county"
must be read "city." If the two appraisers provided by the
1923 act cannot agree, "the Secretary of Agriculture through
his officers or agents may appoint a disinterested citizen to
assist in determining the amount of damage sustained." Under the 1917 act the report of the appraiser was delivered to
the claimant upon his payment of costs and by him delivered
to the "county commissioners," now to the city council. Under the 1923 act the report goes to the Secretary of Agriculture. County commissioners are required to immediately
draw their order upon the county treasurer for payment under the 1917 act, and this is now the law in the excepted
classes of cities. But under the 1923 act the Secretary of Agriculture need not approve the report and he may make further
investigation of the amount of damage sustained. Both acts
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require the appraisers to certify that due diligence was used
to determine the ownership of the guilty dog, that the carcasses of animals killed were buried within twenty-four
hours after the assessment of damages, and that no payment
has already been made by the owner of the dog to the owner
of the injured animal. The act of 1917 did not require the
certificate to cover the matter of non-payment of damages
but it was amended by the act of April 13, 1921, P. L. 130.
Township auditors have been sheep viewers since the
act of 1809. The necessity of prompt burial of the animals
killed and the importance that the information to be gained
by an inspection of the animals and the place are so obvious
that a summary and immediate proceeding is of obvious propriety. The act of May 25, 1893, P. L. 136, names township,
borough or city auditors or controllers as appraisers and these
continue to be the appraisers together with the justice of the
peace, the magistrate or the alderman before whom the complaint is made under the recent acts as stated above.
The payment of claims for losses suffered outside the
limits of the excepted classes of cities is governed by section 29 of the 1921 law as amended by the 5th section of the
act of March 19, 1923, P. L. 16. If the Secretary of Agriculture approves the report of the appraisers, "he shall immediately draw his check in favor of the claimant for the
amount of loss or damage such claimant has sustained according to such report, together with necessary and proper
costs incurred. Such amount shall be paid from the advance
requisition on the 'Dog Fund'."
ENFORCEMENT OF DOG LAWS
Under sections 16 and 39 of the Dog Law of 1917 assessors
report at the end of each year the number, sex,
etc. of all dogs with the names of those owning or harboring
them, to the councilmen of cities of the first and second
class, who under section 34 are charged jointly with the Secretary of Agriculture with the enforcement of the act. But
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under the 17th section of the Dog Law of 1921 the assessors must make their reports to the Secretary of Agriculture, who under section 35 is solely charged "through his officers and agents" with enforcement of the act. All other
departments, bureaus and commissions of the Government
of the Commonwealth "shall, on request of the Secretary of
Agriculture, assist in the enforcement of the provisions of
the act." The like provision in section 34 of the Dog Law
of 1917 used the word "may" instead of the word "shall."
PENALTIES
Failure to comply with the Dog Law of 1917 is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not exceeding $100 or imprisonment not exceeding three months. Section 36 of the
Dog Law of 1921 provides for "conviction in a summary proceeding" and a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $100
or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or both. Fines
under the former act go to the county treasurer but
under the 1921 act the county treasurer must forthwith pay
the same into the State Treasury.
CONFINEMENT OF DOGS
Both acts aim to end the public nuisance involved in
permitting dogs to run at large. Unlicensed dogs, as has
been stated, are to be killed and dogs without tags are presumed to be unlicensed. Tagged dogs are to be detained for
ten days, when, if not redeemed by the owner after notice,
they are to be sold or killed but sales are not to be made for
the purpose of vivisection. Proceeds of dogs sold go to the
county under the 1917 act but to the State Treasurer
under the 1921 act. Under the Dog Law of 1921 an officer
may enter any premises or building to capture a dog found
running at large and which has been pursued into such building. There is no house of refuge for any dog. Interference
with an officer and neglect of duty by an officer are both
offenses under this act. At night a dog must be "(a) con-
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fined within an enclosure from
(b) be firmly secured by means
under the reasonable control of
in lawful hunting accompanied

which it cannot escape, or
of a collar and chain, or (c)
some person or be engaged
by an owner or handler."

GUILTY DOGS TO BE KILLED
The act of 1893, P. L. 136, relieved of liability those who
killed their dogs when they were found guilty of causing
damage to sheep. The provision was embodied in section
31 of the Dog Law of 1917. Section 32 of the Dog Law of
1921 expressly provides that the killing of guilty dogs by
their owners shall not remove their liability for damage
caused by them. However, the Secretary of Agriculture may
notify the owner to immediately kill such dogs and if he
fail to do so for ten days, the Secretary of Agriculture may
notify the chief of police to kill the dogs wherever found.
Since provisions of the Dog Law of 1921 relating to the payment of damages are not operative in cities of the first and
second class, it may be contended that dog owners may still
procure exemption from personal liability by killing their
dogs. But the reasonable construction of section 39 of the
law is to construe the phrase "payment of damages" as referring only to such payment out of the local dog fund. All
the provisions of the act of 1921 are operative in the excepted cities except those governing the licensing of dogs and the
payment of damages. Sections 22, 23, 24 and 25, which provide for killing all dogs caught in the act of pursuing or
wounding livestock, poultry or human beings, prohibit the
poisoning of dogs, make dogs the subject of larceny, provide
for their confinement, etc. are as operative in the excepted
cities as elsewhere.
Section 38 of the 1917 act and 41 of the 1921 act provide
that their provisions shall be deemed severable and that the
unconstitutionality of one or more provisions shall not affect
the validity of the remaining provisions.
J. P. McKEEHAN
TO

BE

CONTINUED
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MOOT COURT
BONNER VS. SCHUYLER
Assignment of

Debts-Partial Assignment-Consent
5 Wheaton 277 and 75 Pa. 399 Cited.

of

Debtor-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Schuyler was In debt to X for $1500, X was in debt to Bonner for
$1000. When this debt was created X promised Bonner that Schuyler
would pay it out of the money he owed X. X is now dead. No
notice was given to Schuyler of the agreement between X and Bonner
for four months. No other person claimed payment from Schuyler
for any part of his debt to X. This is an action of assumpsit for
the $1000.
Best, for Plaintiff.
Bobick, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Carriggs, J. The plaintiff has come to this court seeking to
enforce, as he claims, a contract of novation.
To constitute a novation whereby a new creditor is substituted
for the original one, there must be a mutual agreement among three
or more parties, whereby a debtor, in consideration of being discharged from his liability to his original creditor, contracts a new obligation in favor of a new creditor. So a verbal assignment of a
chose in action, not evidenced by a note or any other writing, assented to by the debtor who promises to pay the debt to the assignee,
constitutes a complete novation. 29 Cyc. 1137.
Testing the above state of facts by this definition we find that it
is lacking in one of the essential elements, that of the mutual assent
of the three parties.
A contract of novation is never presumed, and he who alleges
it must establish it by proper proof. 171 Pa. 644; 255 Pa. 573. The
plaintiff is this case in no way attempts to prove the novation. We
do not see how he possibly could prove it, there being no witnesses
to the transaction. Under the Acts of May 3, 1887, and June 11,
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1891, where one of the parties to an agreement is dead, and no living witness has been called to testify in regard to any matter relative to the agreement that occurred prior to the death of the decedent, the surviving party is not competent to testify as to what took
place, so the testimony of Bonner as to what occurred between himself and X is inadmissible.
On the theory of a novation contract the plaintiff cannot recover. Could the plaintiff succeed on the theory of an assignment?
We think not. It has been held in 75 Pa. 399, that where an order is
drawn for the whole of a particular fund, and after notice to the
drawee, it binds the funds in his hands. Where, however, the assignment is for part only the law seems otherwise.
In 5 Wheat. 277, Justice Story has laid down the rule, which
seems to be accepted in Pennsylvania, that when an order is drawn
on a general or particular fund for a part only, it does not amount
to an assignment of that part or give a lien as against drawee, unless he consents. The reason for the rule is that it would break up a
single cause of action into many actions.
In the base at bar, X was endeavoring to assign part of his
claim against Schuyler to the plaintiff Bonner, and under the rule
laid down above such assignment would fail.
Judgment for defendant.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The question here, as we conceive it, is, not whether there was
a novation but whether there was an obligation put on the debtor of
B, who was debtor of A, to pay a portion of the debt owed to B, to
A, in satisfaction of B's debt to A.
That X may assign his money claim against Y so as to impose on
Y the duty of paying the assignee of X there can be no doubt. Nor
is Y's consent necessary. Notice of the assignment would be necessary to give validity to it, should Y, in ignorance of it, make a payment to X, or otherwise alter his position in such way, that, to enforce the assignment would be injurious to him.
It is ordinarily said that without the debtor's consent a debt
cannot be broken into parts by the creditor, by an assignment of a
part of it. The debtor cannot be subjected to a servitude to two or
more persons Instead of one. He cannot be made liable to two suits
by two persons, with the attendant costs and inconvenience.
The debtor may however consent to the partition of the debt and
thus deprive himself of the right to object to the partialness of the
assignment. He consented apparently in Lamponi vs. Barri, 65 Super. 576. "A representative of the defendant, agreed with the plain-
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tiff," says the opinion, "that the defendants would pay the amount
of the loan (of the plaintiff) to the plaintiff, out of moneys in hand,
or presently to become due." Here there is no consent.
The
In the case before us, the debt of the defendant was $1500.
assignment was of $1000 of this sum, to the plaintiff. We think the
learned court below has properly disallowed the claim. The debtor
should not be inconvenienced, without his consent, by having to adjust
claims with two creditors instead of one. It is said that no notice
of the assignment of $1000 of the $1500 debt was given to Schuyler,
for 4 months. This delay we think immaterial inasmuch as it does
not appear that during those months, Schuyler made payments to his
original creditor or to anyone.
If Schuyler is compelled to pay $1000 to Bonner, he may still be
sued by X, or X's executor, for the debt, and be troubled with finding
proof of his having made the partial payment, or of his authority to
make It.
The doctrine of Mandeville vs. Welch, 5 Wheaton 277, has been
accepted on more than one occasion by the courts of Pennsylvania,
that an assignment of part of a debt cannot bind the debtor, unless
he has consented; Jermyn vs. Moffit, 75 Pa. 399; Geist's Appeal, 104
Pa. 351.
The decision of the learned court below is affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH VS. SPENCER
of
Defendant-Prior
Criminal Law-Evidence-Cross-Examination
Similar Offenses as Evidence-Creditability of DefendantAct of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20--225 Pa. 113
and 74 Super. 320 Cited.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Indictment for statutory rape. Spencer, as a witness, denies his
guilt. He called witnesses to testify to his good character and reputation. Later, he was recalled and asked by the Commonwealth
whether he had ever been similarly accused. He said he had not
been. A Justice of the Peace was then called who swore that two
years before the prisoner was accused before him of a similar act,
and, that he admitted the truth of the charge. A conviction has
followed. The prisoner alleges that the cross-examination was improper in view of the Act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20, and appeals.
Schiavo, for Plaintiff.
Shenkman, for Defendant.

-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

775

OPINION OF THE COURT
Singer, J. The Act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20, entitled "An act
regulating in criminal trials the cross-examination of a defendant
when testifying in his own behalf," provides as follows:-"Hereafter
any person charged with any crime, and called as a witness in his
own behalf, shall not be asked, and if asked, shall not be required
to answer any question tending to show that he has committed,
or been charged with, or been convicted of any offense other than
the one wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show that
he has been of bad character or reputation, unless-l, He shall have
at such trial, personally or by his advocate, asked questions of the
witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good
reputation or character, or has given evidence tending to prove his
own good character or reputation or:-2. He shall have testified at
such trial against a co-defendant charged with the same offense.
The Act forbids cross-examination with reference to the commission of other acts unless the case falls within the first or second exceptions mentioned therein. While the defendant did not ask questions of witnesses for the Commonwealth with a view to establish
his own good reputation or character, he called a number of character
witnesses and thus brought himself within the provisions of the
act, providing for an exception in those cases where the defendant
has given evidence tending to prove his own good character or
reputation. In -other words, where it appears from the record, that
the appellant's case was entirely outside of the operation of the statute, it must be governed by the law as it existed before the enactment of the statute, 251 Pa. 247.
What was the law before the enactment of the statute? The
case of Commonwealth vs. Racco in 225 Pa. 113, furnishes the answer. Therein it was held that where the accused takes the stand In
his own behalf, he may be asked on cross-examination, in order to
test his creditibility, whether he had not been convicted and sent to
prison for other similar offenses; and if he answers no, it may be
shown for the purpose of contradicting him and impeaching his
credibility, that he made declarations to the effect that he had been
convicted and sentenced for such crime.
The cross-examination of the defendant was therefore proper
and the truth of his answers to the questions asked was material
in the consideration by the jury of the credibility of the whole of
his testimony.
If it was proper for the Commonwealth to ask him
questions on his cross-examination, it was certainly not concluded
by his answers and could not be denied the right to contradict him
by evidence tending to show he was an untruthful witness. It is
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understood that this evidence was neither offered nor admitted for
the purpose of attacking the previous good reputation of the defendant as shown by the evidence, but for the purpose of contradicting
him on a material matter and thus destroy in whole or in part his
claim to be a credible witness, 65 Super. 599.
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Garanchoske, 251 Pa. 247, the
idea is further brought out in the following language of the opinion.
"In the third, fourth, and fifth assignments, the Commonwealth was
permitted to show by other witnesses, that the defendant had committed other offenses for the purpose of showing his bad reputation.
This evidence does not come within the Act of 1911, since the Act
applies exclusively to the cross-examination of the defendant. The
general rule therefore applies that proof of character must be limited
to the general reputation with respect to the particular offense
charged and that evidence of particular acts cannot be given."
So far our findings have been governed by dicta and the doctrine of Stare Decisis, and now we feel that the circumstances are
worthy of some comment and criticism.
It cannot be denied that the cross-examination of a defendant as
to a former conviction, although intended merely to test his credibility, has a more far-reaching effect. Namely, that the jury of
twelve laymen, untrained in legal discrimination, become undoubtedly
prejudiced, be it consciously or unconsciously, against the defendant
upon the introduction of such evidence. The courts realize fully the
inevitable result of the admission of such evidence, but fearing to
face the issue squarely lest It upset their dearly beloved, "Precedents," loudly repeat so that the din raised shall cover the fallacy of
their reasoning, that this evidence is not offered nor admitted for
the purpose of attacking the previous good reputation of the defendant, but for the purpose of contradicting him on a material
matter.
It is not for us to attempt to suggest a solution to the unfortunate situation mentioned, but merely to bring attention to it, that
wiser heads may settle it.
Still more inequitable does the present situation become when
the defendant has not been convicted of a former offense but has
merely been accused of it. For though the defendant may have been
innocent in the former charge yet the effect on the jury is unfortunately far from being in favor of the defendant but inversely, shifts a
rather heavy burden -upon him to regain at least their impartial attitude. For this inequitable result the courts are not to blame. It is
our learned legislature alone who have the power to amend the situation and that can be done by obliterating the words "or has been
charged with" in the statute referred to and discussed herein.
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Counsel for the defense contends that the evidence of the Justice of the Peace was not the best evidence and therefore should
not have been allowed, but since that objection is not contained in
the assignments of error we will not comment upon it.
For the various reasons given, the objections are overrided and
the Judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Commonwealth vs. Racco, 225 Pa. 113, is authority for the questions put to the defendant by the Commonwealth, unless the act of
March 13th, 1911, P. L. 30, prevents. That act allows such questions when the defendant "has given evidence tending to prove his
own good character or reputation." The defendant has called witnesses, who have testified to his good reputation. The case is then
where it would have been if the act of 1911 had not been enacted.
Commonwealth vs. Burke, 74 Super, 320; Commonwealth vs. Dietrich,
65 Super. 599. We affirm the judgment of the learned court below
for the reasons stated in its opinion. The principle that when a man
is on trial for a crime, he cannot be shown to have committed another crime, is subject to this exception, that the reputation may be
refuted, as evidence of innocence, by proof that it did not tally
with the facts.
Affirmed.

BAKER VS. COULBER
Wills--Revocation by Birth of Children After Execution-Provision
for After-Born Child-Sufficiency of Provision NonEssential-Wills Act of 1917, P. L. 403.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mary Baker left a will in which she devised her land to her husband, but if he should die before her, then to their children whether
then living or thereafter to be born. The husband survived the wife,
and contracted to sell the land to Coulber. Coulber objected to the
title because two children now living were born after the will was
written, and as to whom the will was inoperative. The court has
held that the mention of unborn children satisfies the statute and
made the will valid as against them.
Gottlieb, for Plaintiff.
King, for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
J. Kirk J.
In order to render a proper decision in this case
it will be necessary for us to go back and trace the law as to afterborn children, from the common law of England up to the present law.
The will of a feme sole was revoked by her marriage, while marriage and the birth of a child conjointly revoked thd will of a man.
Where there was a provision made for the wife and children the
birth of a child did not produce revocation. In Pennsylvania this was
changed by an act passed the 4th of February 1749, which provided
that when a testator should afterwards marry or have a child or
children not named in any such will the testator should, so far as
regards such children, be deemed to die intestate. This act was
repealed by the Act of theh 23d of March 1764, which substituted for
the words "not named in any such will," the words, " not provided
for in any such will," and this act was substantially re-enacted by
the Acts of April 19, 1794 and April 3, 1833 which continue this language as does the present Wills Act. However under the Wills Act
the language Is general and without distinction to sex.
The question which arises is whether the provision in the will
constitutes a sufficient provision for a child born after the execution
of a will to prevent intestacy as to such children in accordance with
section 21 of the Wills Act.
In Newlin's Estate 209 Pa. 456, Chief Justice Mitchell states, "It
appears to have been universally conceded that an actual provision
clearly intended for the after-born child will satisfy the statute, no
matter how small the provision is."
It was held in Randall vs. Dunlap, 218 Pa. 210, that all the act
of April 8, 1833 requires relative to the provision for an unborn
child, is that the testator shall have the child In mind and shall make
clear that the will was to apply to it.
Any provision which does that
is sufficient, and the inquiry whether large or small, vested or contingent, present or future, is irrelevant and outside the jurisdiction
of the courts. In this case the testator made no express or material
provision for any after-born children, but merely said, "I declare this
to be my last will and testament, and that after-born children are
herein provided for."
In Schaper vs. Pitts. Coal Co., 266 Pa. 154, it was held "that
where a testator gave and bequeathed to his wife, 'all my remaining property so long as she remains my widow, to have and to hold
for her own, but if she should choose to marry again, then she is to
have one-third, the other two-thirds to be held by her In trust for
their children until the youngest becomes of age,' this was a sufficient provision to satisfy the statute as to that child."
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Judge Sharswood in Willard's Appeal, 78 Pa. 327, says the statute makes no qualification as to the fullness and equality of the
provision. All that it.requires is that the parent shall have the unborn child in mind and shall make clear an intention that the will
should apply to it.
In this case after a devise to the wife for life,
there was a remainder "over to my heirs at law, share and share
alike, to those heirs who shall be living or entitled to be represented
In said estate.'" it was held that this was not a sufficient provision
for an after-born child, but it will be noted that there was no evidence whatsoever that the testator ever had this child in contemplation when he spoke of his heirs.
There can be no doubt that Mary Baker had the after-born
children in mind and intended the will to apply to them. Hence
there can be no argument as to the husband's ability to convey a
good title.
Courts of other jurisdictions, interpreting similar acts have unanimously held the rule to be that if a provision be made in the will
for an after-born child and equal to that made for other children,
in being at the time of the testator's death, then the posthumous
child cannot take against the will, provided-that the birth of the
said child was contemplated by testator when he executed the will.
137 Mass. 527, 164 Wis. 527, 164 Mass. 527. Judgment for plaintiff
affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The Wills Act of 1917, P. L. 403, 410, speaks of a child or children,
born after the making of a will by its parent, "and not provided for
in such will."
This phrase awakens queries. To what extent must the child
be provided for? An after-born child Is no more meritorious than
a previously born child. A previously born child may be entirely
pretermitted in its parent's will. There seems no reason for denying to the parent the right to deal in the same way with the afterborn child. The question then has become, not one of power to deny
to the after-born, a share of the estate. That is conceded. It Is
one of Intention. From the non-existence of the child may be suspected that his future existence was not in the thought of the testator, and that the omission to name him was not due to the purpose
that he should take nothing, but to the oversight of his possible arrival.
Where it is clear that there was no such oversight, the will
will be valid even as against an after-born child for whom there Is
no provision. Such Is the conclusion reached by the reflections of the
courts.
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The gift to the husband was contingent on his surviving his
wife. He has survived her. The gift to him Is therefore absolute.
He can make a good title. There is no reason for excusing the vendee
from payment of the purchase money.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

TAYLOR VS. HOPEWELL AND WIFE
Practise, C. P.-Opening of Judgments-Right of Married Woman
to Open Judgment Entered on Note-Laches of Petitioner-Equitable or Positive Right-64 Super.
350 and 236 Pa. 26 Distinguished.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A note for $500 was made by the defendants in 1902. Four years
later a judgment was entered on the warrant of attorney. In 1910
a scire facias to revive and an alias scire facias were Issued, both
returned nihil. A judgment was entered. Four years after this
judgment of revival a scire facias and an alias were returned nihil
and a judgment was entered. Four years after this judgment was
entered, Airs. Hopewell, wishing to defend on the ground that she
was a surety for her husband, asks the court to open the judgments
and allow her to make this defense. The court refused. Appeal.
Angle, for Plaintiff.
Gunnett, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Heller, J. We are called upon in this case to answer the question whether the defendant, Mrs. Hopewell, Is barred from presenting the defense that she was a surety for her husband on
the note given to the plaintiff after she allowed the judgment to
be entered and stand against her for the period of time as stated in
the facts of the case.
If the petition for opening judgment entered on a note shows
good grounds, the judgment will be opened, Little vs. Jeffers, 42 Super
519. Thus we are not concerned whether or not a wife will be
presumed to be a surety when .he signs a note with her husband.
The judgment must be opened before a defense or any evidence can
be presented for the purpose of showing whether or not the wife
was a surety, Dikeman vs. Butterfield, 35 Pa. 236. Generally there
is no limitation of time for exercising the equitable power of the
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court to open or set aside a confessed judgment; but such applications when made after such an unreasonable delay on defendant's
part as to make him chargeable with laches are viewed with great
disfavor and will not be granted except on very strong grounds, 23
Cyc. 722.
A judgment entered against a married woman on a note which
she signed as surety for her husband will be opened because the
signing of such a note by the wife not only contravenes public
policy but offends against a positive statute. The wife is not estopped from asserting her right to have the judgment opened by the
fact that she took no steps to have the judgment opened until
four years after its entry." This decision, held in Murray vs. McDonald, 236 Pa. 26, presents the application of the defendant to have
judgment opened with sufficiently strong grounds for its opening.
We are of the opinion that the court erred in refusing to open
the judgment to take testimony to determine whether the defendant Mrs. Hopewell was a surety.
The assignments of error are sustained and the record is remitted wih the direction that the defendant be permitted to file
her defense.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
'Te statute gives to married women, power, generally, to make
-contmcts. It excepts contracts for money, made for accomodation,
,or as surety, or guarantor. The giving of a warrant of attorney
to confess judgment does not preclude the woman's alleging, if judg:ment is 'entered on the warrant, that she executed the note as surety, guarantor, or 'for aucomodation, and procuring the opening of
the judgment on such allegation, Murray vs. McDonald, 236 Pa. 2&
In this case, judgment was entered on the warrant. That judgment was revived; this latter judgment was also revived. Twelve
years after the giving of the note and after two revivals, the ap,
plication to open Is made. We might follow the opinion in Steltzer
vs. Beatty, 64 Super. '350, and think that the delay in applying to
the court for relief -was too great to justify the grant of the relief
sought. But, according to Murray vs. McDonald, supra, the ground
for opening the judgment is not an alleged equity, the right to urge
which is lost by laches, but the fact that the giving of the note contravened public policy, and offended against a positive statute. If'
this is so, the lapse of twelve years before challenging it should not
give a virtual validity to the note.
nent of the learned court below.

We therefore affiin. the judg-
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WAHL'S ESTATE
Bills and Notes---Consideration for Promisory Notes-Notes Given to
Children-Revocation by Death-Presumption in Case of
Checks-Gift of Check to Children-64 Super. 141
and 192 Pa. 117 Cited.
STATEMBNT OF FACTS
Wahl gave to his son, Henry, a note for $1000, payable at his
(the maker's) death, negotiable in form, and not under seal, intending it to be instead of a will. Wahl has died. Objection is made
by the widow to the payment because there was no consideration.
Another son, James, presented a check on a bank in which the deceased kept a deposit, which by its terms was payable at once. It
was not presented until ten days after the death of the deceased.
The auditor has refused payment on both check and note.
Stickler, for Plaintiff.
Stoner, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
P. Smith, J. A promissory note for $1000,. was given by the decedent to his son Henry, negotiable in form, and payable at the
maker's death. The instrument was not under seal. The writing
thus given was presented for allowance. as a debt of the decedent.
An objection was made thereto by the widow on the ground that
there was no consideration. As the paper relied on is not under
seal, it is not enforceable against the promisor or his estate unless
supported by a valuable consideration: (No such consideration is
evident in this case.)
Natural love and affection are not sufficient to support a promise to make a gift. These are a good consideration for an executed
contract or gift, and in Pennsylvania a moral obligation is a good
consideration for an express promise, but natural love and affection are not moral obligations in such a sense as will support an express promise to make a gift. A consideration founded on mere
love and affection is not sufficient to sustain a suit on a bill or
note, Daniel on Negotiable Instruments. Sec. 179; Byles on Bills
page 144.
In Snayberger's Estate, 62 Sup. 390, the facts are almost identical. The appellant was one of nine children to each of whom the
decedent gave a negotiable promise in writing to pay $600 six months
after the maker's death. The instruments were not under seal.
The writing were presented as debts of the decedent. An objection
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was made by the widow that payment should not be made on the
grounds that they were not under seal, and supported by no valuable consideration. The court held that the notes were voluntary
promises merely and revocable at the death of the maker. If the
claims had been evidenced by sealed instruments, the situation would
have been different for the seals would have implied a sufficient
consideration. The doctrine applicable in such cases has been held
in Kern's Est., 171 Pa. 55, Luebbe's Est., 178 Pa. 447.
The courts have steadfastly held that the delivery of a promissory note is not an executed gift of the money and is revocable
at the death of the maker, before actual payment, 14 American and
Eng. Ency. 1030; Commey vs. MacFarland, 97 Pa. 361; Kennedy vs.
Ware, 1 Pa. 445; Crawford's Appeal, 61 Pa. 52. In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion that the auditor was justified in refusing payment on the note.
As to the check presented by decedent's son James, and payable at once, we can see no reason for considering this as a gift.
The check Itself is evidence of indebtedness from the maker to the
payee and implies that the maker owes that much money to the
payee, In 13 Pa. 176, it was held that a check of itself is not evidence of a debt or loan of money. Prima facia however the presumption is that It is given either in payment of a debt or that
cash was given for it at the time, 1 Pa. C. C. 184; 13 Pa. 177. In
Wilkinson's Estate, 192 Pa. 117, a check drawn by the husband to
the order of his wife was found among the wife's papers a month
after both had died. The court held that the check was a valid
obligation in favor of the wife's estate against her husband's estate.
The non-payment or delay in presenting the check does not
excuse payment. The only effect the laches of the drawee could
have, would be damages suffered by the drawee by reason of the delay in presenting the check. We are of the opinion that the auditor erred in refusing payment of the check.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The note was not sealed.

To make it binding, a consideration

was necessary. None such appears. The burden of showing that
there was no consideration is on the party who made the note. But
it is shown that there was no consideration. The learned court below has properly decided that payment of the note cannot be enforced. Tissue's Estate, 64 Super. 141, Kern's Estate, 171 Pa. 55.
Another son presents a check on the bank in which the drawer
of it had a deposit. That might have been a gift; it might have
been payment of a debt previously existent, or arising at the time
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of the making of the check. If it was a gift, it would be no more
enforceable than would the note. But, if it was in payment of a
debt, It would be enforceable. In the absence of evidence as to
the reason of the check, may we presume anything, and if so, what?
We do not presume a loan 'or a gift. We do presume that
the check is payment of a debt. Until this presumption Is overcome, It must prevail. It is proper, then, to allow payment of the
check from the estate, the bank on which it was drawn not having
paid It. Cutler's Appeal, 192 Pa. 117; F emming's Exec. vs. McClain
13 Pa. 177.
The judgment

of the learned court below is

affirmed.

